Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line

Steven A. Ramirez

Loyola University of Chicago School of Law

January 27, 2011

Chapman Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2011
Loyola University Chicago School of Law Research Paper No. 2011-016

The Dodd-Frank Act will prevent a future debt crisis arising from subprime mortgage debt. The Act will fail, however, to prevent other future debt crises leading to future financial crises because the Act fails to address the distorted incentives to accumulate excessive debt and the distorted incentives for large financial firms to gamble on debt instruments. The Act preserves the power of the government to bailout financial firms deemed too-big-to-fail. The Act preserves the ability of such firms (at least over the short and medium term) to speculate in debt instruments through derivatives, securities and hedge fund activities. The Act also fails to assure the disruption of CEO primacy, as a matter of corporate governance law. In short, the Act constitutes a limited response to the crisis of 2007-2009, at best. CEOs still retain the power and still face incentives to saddle their firms with excessive risks at the expense of shareholders and society in general.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: corporate governance, financial regulation, Dodd-Frank-Act, CEO Primacy

JEL Classification: E44, E65, E66, G18, G38, H60, K22

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Date posted: July 29, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Ramirez, Steven A., Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line (January 27, 2011). Chapman Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2011; Loyola University Chicago School of Law Research Paper No. 2011-016. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1896564

Contact Information

Steven A. Ramirez (Contact Author)
Loyola University of Chicago School of Law ( email )
25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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