Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1897997
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation


Guido Friebel


Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Marc Ivaldi


Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jérôme Pouyet


affiliation not provided to SSRN

July 2011

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8491

Abstract:     
This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Network access, Transport economics, Vertical Separation

JEL Classification: L14, L42, L51, L92

working papers series


Date posted: July 28, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Friebel, Guido and Ivaldi, Marc and Pouyet, Jérôme, Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation (July 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8491. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1897997

Contact Information

Guido Friebel (Contact Author)
Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Marc Ivaldi
Toulouse School of Economics ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France
+33 5 61 12 8592 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Jérôme Pouyet
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


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