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Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts


Kevin J. Murphy


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; University of Southern California - Department of Economics; USC Gould School of Law

October 1999


Abstract:     
Research in incentives has focused on performance measures and pay-performance sensitivities but has largely ignored a third significant dimension: the performance standard. Performance standards generate important incentives whenever plan participants can influence the standard-setting process. I describe management bonus contracts and the role of performance standards, distinguishing between "internally determined" standards that are directly affected by management actions in the current or prior year, and "externally determined" standards that are less easily affected. I show that companies choose external standards when prior-year performance is a noisy estimate of contemporaneous performance. In addition, companies using budget-based and other internally determined performance standards have less-variable bonus payouts, and are more likely to smooth earnings from year to year, than companies using externally determined standards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

JEL Classification: J33, J44, M41, M43, G30

working papers series


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Date posted: November 26, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Kevin J., Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts (October 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=189808 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.189808

Contact Information

Kevin J. Murphy (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
BRI 308, MC 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
213-740-6553 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)
University of Southern California - Department of Economics
3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
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References:  28
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