Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899344
 
 

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Trading Cycles for School Choice


Marek Pycia


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

M. Utku Ünver


Boston College - Department of Economics

July 31, 2011


Abstract:     
In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environ- ments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

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Date posted: August 2, 2011 ; Last revised: October 19, 2011

Suggested Citation

Pycia, Marek and Ünver, M. Utku, Trading Cycles for School Choice (July 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899344

Contact Information

Marek Pycia (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )
405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States
Utku Unver
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
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