Trading Cycles for School Choice
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)
M. Utku Ünver
Boston College - Department of Economics
July 31, 2011
In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environ- ments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver , and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai  hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
Date posted: August 2, 2011 ; Last revised: October 19, 2011
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 2.532 seconds