Political Consequences of the MMM Systems in Taiwan and Japan
Dept. of Political Science, National Chengchi University
APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
Since electoral systems structure how representation works, it is not surprising that changes in electoral rules and their consequences always attract close attention. This paper explores how some differences in less-high-profile rules might have caused divergent speed and extent of reaching some theoretically expected political consequences.
We compare two East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, because both of them abandoned the decades old single nontransferable vote multimember district (SNTV-MMD) system and endorsed the similar mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Focusing on three differences between Japan and Taiwan, including dual candidacy, regional PR constituency, and PR threshold, we tap their possible consequences on macro-level party systems and district-level strategic voting patterns. Further careful comparative studies and rigorous causal analyses are called for to study this topic.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: mixed-member electoral system, effective number of parties, SF ratio, Taiwan, Japanworking papers series
Date posted: August 1, 2011 ; Last revised: September 12, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.359 seconds