Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1903994
 
 

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Legal Origin or Colonial History?


Daniel M. Klerman


University of Southern California Law School

Paul G. Mahoney


University of Virginia School of Law

Holger Spamann


Harvard Law School

Mark Weinstein


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department; University of Southern California - Gould School of Law

August 2, 2011

Journal of Legal Analysis, Forthcoming
USC CLEO Research Paper No. C11-9
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 11-16
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2011-03

Abstract:     
Economists have documented pervasive correlations between legal origins, modern regulation, and economic outcomes around the world. Where legal origin is exogenous, however, it is almost perfectly correlated with another set of potentially relevant background variables: the colonial policies of the European powers that spread the “origin” legal systems through the world. We attempt to disentangle these factors by exploiting the imperfect overlap of colonizer and legal origin, and looking at possible channels, such as the structure of the legal system, through which these factors might influence contemporary economic outcomes. We find strong evidence in favor of non-legal colonial explanations for economic growth. For other dependent variables, the results are mixed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: legal origin, colonial origin, colonial history, economic growth, civil law, common law

JEL Classification: K40, N40, P50, O19, O40

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: August 3, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Klerman, Daniel M. and Mahoney, Paul G. and Spamann, Holger and Weinstein, Mark, Legal Origin or Colonial History? (August 2, 2011). Journal of Legal Analysis, Forthcoming; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C11-9; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 11-16; Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2011-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1903994

Contact Information

Daniel M. Klerman (Contact Author)
University of Southern California Law School ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.klerman.com

Paul G. Mahoney
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7343 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

Holger Spamann
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Mark Ira Weinstein
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )
Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6499 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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