Abstract

 


 



The Compleat Economic Voter: New Evidence from the UK


Michael S. Lewis-Beck


University of Iowa - Department of Political Science

Richard Nadeau


University of Montreal

Martial Foucault


University of Montreal; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

August 3, 2011


Abstract:     
While economic voting has been much studied, almost all the work has been based on the classic reward-punishment model, which treats the economy as a valence issue. The economic is, indeed, a valence issue, but it is much more than that. In the work at hand, we explore two other dimensions of economic voting – position and patrimony. Through investigation of a 2010 UK election survey containing relevant measures on these three dimensions, we estimate their impact on vote intention, in the context of a carefully specified system of equations. According to the evidence reported, each dimension of economic voting has its own independent effect. Moreover, together, they reveal a “compleat” economic voter, who wields considerable power over electoral choice in Britain. This result, while new, confirms and extends recent work on US and French elections.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

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Date posted: August 4, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Nadeau, Richard and Foucault, Martial, The Compleat Economic Voter: New Evidence from the UK (August 3, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1904682

Contact Information

Michael S. Lewis-Beck
University of Iowa - Department of Political Science ( email )
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States
319-335-2350 (Phone)
Richard Nadeau (Contact Author)
University of Montreal ( email )
Department of Political Science
C.P. 6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
Martial Foucault
University of Montreal ( email )
Political Science Department
C.P. 6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3T 1B9, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)
2020 rue University, 25th floor
Montreal H3C 3J7, Quebec
Canada
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