Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905267
 
 

Citations



 


 



Voluntary Quality Disclosure Under Price-Signaling Competition


Fabio Caldieraro


University of Washington

Dongsoo Shin


Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business

Andrew Stivers


FDA

August 4, 2011

Managerial and Decision Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating equilibrium in our model depending on the parameters. Our analysis reveals that, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not only the high-quality firm, but also the low-quality firm chooses to disclose its product quality to soften the price competition.

Keywords: oligopoly, price competition, signaling, voluntary quality disclosure

JEL Classification: D82, L13, L15, M3

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 6, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Caldieraro, Fabio and Shin, Dongsoo and Stivers, Andrew, Voluntary Quality Disclosure Under Price-Signaling Competition (August 4, 2011). Managerial and Decision Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905267

Contact Information

Fabio Caldieraro
University of Washington ( email )
NE Colombia Rd.
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
Dongsoo Shin (Contact Author)
Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business ( email )
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States
Andrew Stivers
FDA ( email )
5600 Fishers Lane
Rockville, MD 20857-0001
United States
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