Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1906040
 
 

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Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships


Arthur Campbell


Yale University, School of Management

Florian Ederer


Yale School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Johannes Spinnewijn


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

April 24, 2013

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We analyze the interaction between the incentives for free-riding and information revelation among partners in a dynamic setting. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own contribution efforts. The desire to maintain a partner's motivation to exert effort leads to a reluctance to share information which in turn affects the incentives to exert effort. Both free-riding and the lack of information revelation inefficiently delay project implementation. When the deadline for project implementation is far away, unsuccessful partners freeride on each other's efforts. When the deadline draws close, successful partners stop revealing their success in an attempt to incentivize other group members to continue to exert effort. Surprisingly, setting a tighter deadline may increase the expected time until the project is implemented, but may also increase the expected value of the project. We show that there is a unique finite optimal deadline that maximizes beneficial productive efforts while avoiding unnecessary delays. As long as the deadline is set optimally, welfare is higher when information is only privately observable rather than revealed to the entire partnership.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: information search, information disclosure, group decisions, deadlines

JEL Classification: D71, D82, D83, H42

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: August 7, 2011 ; Last revised: August 22, 2013

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Arthur and Ederer, Florian and Spinnewijn, Johannes, Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships (April 24, 2013). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1906040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1906040

Contact Information

Arthur Campbell
Yale University, School of Management ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
Florian Ederer (Contact Author)
Yale School of Management ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/florianederer/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Johannes Spinnewijn
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
00 44 (0) 20 7955 7022 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/spinnewijn_johannes/
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