Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907927
 
 

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The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty


Leigh Osofsky


University of Miami - School of Law

August 10, 2011

Tax Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2011

Abstract:     
Against a backdrop of ongoing angst regarding release of tax guidance, an important idea has surfaced in the tax compliance literature. Prominent tax compliance scholars have argued that the strategic use of tax law uncertainty may cause taxpayers to report higher tax liability. While these arguments have strong economic appeal, this Article counsels against their acceptance. In contrast to the support for strategic uncertainty in the literature, I argue that this move may have perverse effects on taxpayer reporting and may lower, rather than raise, revenue. This argument relies on fundamental features of the tax compliance framework, which could create significant problems with translating the theory behind strategic uncertainty into less underreporting. As a result, this Article cautions against reliance on strategic uncertainty as a tax compliance tool.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: tax compliance, uncertainty, risk, ambiguity, penalties

JEL Classification: H20, H24, H25, H26, H29, K34

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Date posted: August 11, 2011 ; Last revised: August 13, 2011

Suggested Citation

Osofsky, Leigh, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty (August 10, 2011). Tax Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907927

Contact Information

Leigh Osofsky (Contact Author)
University of Miami - School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 248087
Coral Gables, FL 33146
United States
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