Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908172
 
 

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Mechanisms of Board Turnover: Evidence from Backdating


Frederick L. Bereskin


University of Delaware

Clifford W. Smith Jr.


Simon Graduate School of Business, University of Rochester

February 28, 2014


Abstract:     
We analyze board-turnover of firms implicated in stock-option backdating to assess the effectiveness of board elections. Despite high reelection rates among nominated directors, board-turnover is substantial. Critically, these turnover decisions are affected by the anticipated outcome of a potential shareholder vote. Thus, reelection rates are of limited value in assessing the effectiveness of shareholder voting. Independent and management directors depart though different mechanisms: independent directors primarily are not renominated, while management directors generally resign. Finally, directors who are involved in backdating experience reductions in both the number and prestige of their directorships.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

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Date posted: August 11, 2011 ; Last revised: March 2, 2014

Suggested Citation

Bereskin, Frederick L. and Smith, Clifford W., Mechanisms of Board Turnover: Evidence from Backdating (February 28, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1908172

Contact Information

Frederick L. Bereskin (Contact Author)
University of Delaware ( email )
Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics
Newark, DE 19716
United States
Clifford W. Smith Jr.
Simon Graduate School of Business, University of Rochester ( email )
Carol Simon Hall 3-202C
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-3217 (Phone)
585-442-6323 (Fax)
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References:  53

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