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The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment


Josse Delfgaauw


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Robert Dur


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Arjan Non


Maastricht University

Willem Verbeke


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

August 11, 2011

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-120/1

Abstract:     
We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners of the first and second round of the tournament. As predicted by theory, we find that a more convex prize spread increases performance in the second round at the expense of first-round performance, although the magnitude of these effects is small. Moreover, the treatment effect is significantly larger for stores that historically have relatively stable performance as compared to stores with more noisy performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: elimination tournaments, incentives, prize spread, performance measurement, field experiment

JEL Classification: C93, M51, M52

working papers series


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Date posted: August 12, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Delfgaauw, Josse, Dur, Robert, Non, Arjan and Verbeke, Willem, The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment (August 11, 2011). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-120/1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908192 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1908192

Contact Information

Josse Delfgaauw (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Robert Dur
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur
Tinbergen Institute
Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Arjan Non
Maastricht University ( email )
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands
Willem Verbeke
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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