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Capital Regulation, Liquidity Requirements and Taxation in a Dynamic Model of Banking


Gianni De Nicolo


International Monetary Fund and CESifo

Andrea Gamba


Warwick Business School - University of Warwick

Marcella Lucchetta


Ca Foscari University of Venice

February 13, 2012

European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2011-025
CentER Working Paper Series No. 2011-090

Abstract:     
This paper studies the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic model where banks are exposed to credit and liquidity risk and can resolve financial distress in three costly forms: bond issuance, equity issuance or fire sales. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between capital requirements and bank lending, efficiency, and welfare, with their benefits turning into costs beyond a certain threshold. By contrast, liquidity requirements reduce lending, efficiency and welfare significantly. On taxation, corporate income taxes generate higher government revenues and entail lower efficiency and welfare costs than taxes on non-deposit liabilities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Capital requirements, liquidity requirements, taxation of liabilities

JEL Classification: G21, G28

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Date posted: September 2, 2011 ; Last revised: February 22, 2012

Suggested Citation

De Nicolo, Gianni, Gamba, Andrea and Lucchetta, Marcella, Capital Regulation, Liquidity Requirements and Taxation in a Dynamic Model of Banking (February 13, 2012). European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2011-025. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1908201

Contact Information

Gianni De Nicolo (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund and CESifo ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-8200 (Phone)
202-623-7271 (Fax)
Andrea Gamba
Warwick Business School - University of Warwick ( email )
Scarman Road
Coventry, CV4 7AL
Great Britain
+44 (0)24 765 24 542 (Phone)
+44 (0)24 765 23 779 (Fax)
Marcella Lucchetta
Ca Foscari University of Venice ( email )
Venice
Italy
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