Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908592
 
 

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Say on Pay, Executive Pay, and Board Dependence


Robert F. Göx


University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW); University of Zurich; University of Zurich - Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology

October 2013

AAA 2012 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper

Abstract:     
I study the impact of "say on pay" (SoP) on the compensation policy and the level of board dependence of a firm in which the CEO has some power over the composition of the board of directors (BoD). My main finding is that SoP can significantly reduce the efficiency of the firm's compensation policy and make the BoD more dependent from the CEO. The result is based on the combination of two effects: First, for a given degree of board dependence, SoP disciplines the BoD and improves the efficiency of its pay practice. Second, whenever there is room for raising the level of board dependence, a powerful CEO captures the resulting surplus by establishing a more dependent BoD. In return, the new BoD offers the CEO a more generous bonus than in the absence of SoP. SoP can only improve the compensation policy of a poorly governed firm in cases where the level of board dependence cannot be adjusted. Overall, my analysis suggests that an isolated adoption of SoP can rather exacerbate than mitigate existing deficiencies in firms' governance structures and compensation policies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Say on Pay, Executive Compensation, Board Dependence, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22, M12, M48

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Date posted: August 12, 2011 ; Last revised: February 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Göx, Robert F., Say on Pay, Executive Pay, and Board Dependence (October 2013). AAA 2012 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908592 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1908592

Contact Information

Robert F. Goex (Contact Author)
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )
Hottingerstrasse 10
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland
University of Zurich ( email )
Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
University of Zurich - Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology ( email )
Plattenstrasse 14
Zürich, 8032
Switzerland
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