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Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum GamesOla AnderssonResearch Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Sebastian KranzUniversity of Ulm Karen Van der WielTilburg University; Netspar; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Erik WengströmUniversity of Copenhagen - Department of Economics August 15, 2011 Economics Letters, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2010 Abstract: We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
Keywords: Persuasion, Communication in games, Cheap talk JEL Classification: C72, C91, D83 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: August 15, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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