Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
University of Ulm
Karen Van der Wiel
Tilburg University; Netspar; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics
August 15, 2011
Economics Letters, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2010
We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
Keywords: Persuasion, Communication in games, Cheap talk
JEL Classification: C72, C91, D83Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 15, 2011
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