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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909910
 
 

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Credit Rating Agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law


Nicolas Petit


University of Liege

August 17, 2011


Abstract:     
This paper explores the possibility of remedial intervention against the credit rating oligopoly under the competition rules. It is divided in six parts. Following an introduction, Part II provides an overview of the credit rating industry. Part III demonstrates that there is a possible economic case for antitrust intervention against the credit rating agencies ("CRAs"). Part IV examines the doctrines of competition law that could be applied against CRAs. Part V reviews possible remedies. Part VI provides a conclusion. The analysis is conducted on the basis of European Union competition law. Subject to national legal idiosyncrasies, it applies mutatis mutandis to other competition law regimes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Credit rating agencies, antitrust, competition law, financial markets, sovereign debt, oligopoly, dominance, conflict of interest, issuer pays

JEL Classification: K21, L4, G1, G2, G3

working papers series


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Date posted: August 15, 2011 ; Last revised: September 2, 2011

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas, Credit Rating Agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law (August 17, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1909910

Contact Information

Nicolas Petit (Contact Author)
University of Liege ( email )
B-4000 Liege
Belgium
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