Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910000
 
 

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Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program


Iwan Bos


Maastricht University

Frederick Wandschneider


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; University of East Anglia (UEA) - School of Economic and Social Studies; University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)

August 15, 2011

CCP Working Paper 11-13

Abstract:     
Cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in some jurisdictions (e.g., the E.U.), whereas in others they are excluded (e.g., the U.S.). This paper provides a survey of identified ringleaders in recent European cartel cases and explores theoretically the effect of ringleader exclusion on collusive prices. Our survey shows that cartels often had more than one ringleader, the role of ringleaders was very diverse and ringleaders were typically the largest cartel members. Our theoretical analysis reveals that ringleader exclusion leads to higher prices when the joint profit maximum cannot be sustained under a non-discriminatory leniency policy, antitrust fines depend on individual cartel gains in a nonlinear fashion and the size distribution of members is sufficiently heterogeneous. These findings support the imposition of antitrust penalties proportional to firm size when ringleaders are excluded from the corporate leniency program.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: cartels, leniency program, ringleader

JEL Classification: L1, L4

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Date posted: August 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Bos, Iwan and Wandschneider, Frederick, Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program (August 15, 2011). CCP Working Paper 11-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910000 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910000

Contact Information

Iwan Bos (Contact Author)
Maastricht University ( email )
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands
Frederick Wandschneider
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
University of East Anglia (UEA) - School of Economic and Social Studies ( email )
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) ( email )
United Kingdom
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