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Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice TheoriesTomáš OtáhalFBE MENDELU in Brno Ladislava GrochováFBE MENDELU in Brno August 15, 2011 Human Capital and Investment in Education: The Collection of The XIV International Scientific Conference, Prague: University of Finance and Administration, 2011 Abstract: Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, Chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption might influence the efficiency of the rule of law. While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how corruption improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing among arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic corruption.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 14 Keywords: Bureaucracy, Corruption, Economic Efficiency, Chicago Public Choice, Virginia Public Choice, Rent-Seeking, Rule of Law JEL Classification: D74, K42, P3 working papers seriesDate posted: August 15, 2011 ; Last revised: June 8, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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