Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910284
 
 

Footnotes (123)



 


 



Contracting Around Liability Rules


Mark A. Lemley


Stanford Law School

February 7, 2012

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 415

Abstract:     
In his influential paper “Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,” Rob Merges makes the case that intellectual property (IP) owners vested with property entitlements can and do contract away their right to an injunction when it is efficient for them to do so. The result was to cement for many the superiority of property over liability rules, since Merges demonstrated a seemingly critical asymmetry between the two. Merges’s evidence suggested that if a judge or a legislature gets the damages calculation wrong, we are stuck with an inefficient liability rule, but that we weren’t similarly stuck with an inefficiently-allocated property rule.

The evidence Merges brought to bear in his path-breaking article is extremely important. But it is incomplete. True, parties can contract around inefficient property rules in IP cases. But as I show in this paper, they can - and do - contract around inefficient liability rules as well. The result does not prove the superiority of liability rules over property rules, but it does undermine a major premise that has been used to support the claim that IP rights must be protected by property rules.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: August 16, 2011 ; Last revised: February 9, 2012

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A., Contracting Around Liability Rules (February 7, 2012). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 415. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910284 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910284

Contact Information

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,289
Downloads: 375
Download Rank: 45,089
Footnotes:  123

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.344 seconds