Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910687
 
 

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Path-Dependency and Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections


Daniel Diermeier


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Costel Andonie


City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK)

August 14, 2011


Abstract:     
We consider a behavioral model of voting in multi-candidate elections. In case of satisfactory payoffs from the poll leader voters increase their propensity to vote for the leading candidate, while in case of unsatisfactory payoffs voters decrease their propensity. We first show that in any stationary distribution and for any configuration of the model, the winner receives a share of 50% of votes. Using results from the 1992 England elections, we show that this implication is consistent with voting data. Second, we show that the process is path-dependent: whether voters manage to coordinate on the majority candidate critically depends on the initial state. Moreover, even if the majority candidate is elected for sure, voting behavior is only partially coordinated.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Formal Political Theory

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D70, D72, H11

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Date posted: August 17, 2011 ; Last revised: August 31, 2011

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Andonie, Costel, Path-Dependency and Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections (August 14, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910687

Contact Information

Daniel Diermeier (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Costel Andonie
City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) ( email )
Department of Marketing
Kowloon Tong
Hong Kong
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