Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior
Emory University School of Law
July 1, 2011
University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 5, 2011
Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-164
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-110
In this brief Article, I explore the growing empirical evidence in support of the public choice model of judicial decision making. Although legal scholars have traditionally been reluctant to engage in a critical inquiry into the role of judicial self-interest on judicial behavior, recent empirical studies confirm many of the predictions of the model. As a result, the public choice model has gained broad acceptance across a range of disciplines, courts, and even the U.S. public.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15
Keywords: judicial decision-making, public choice, law and economics
JEL Classification: K00, K40, K41
Date posted: August 17, 2011 ; Last revised: June 6, 2012
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