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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910918
 
 

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Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior


Joanna Shepherd


Emory University School of Law

July 1, 2011

University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 5, 2011
Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-164
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-110

Abstract:     
In this brief Article, I explore the growing empirical evidence in support of the public choice model of judicial decision making. Although legal scholars have traditionally been reluctant to engage in a critical inquiry into the role of judicial self-interest on judicial behavior, recent empirical studies confirm many of the predictions of the model. As a result, the public choice model has gained broad acceptance across a range of disciplines, courts, and even the U.S. public.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: judicial decision-making, public choice, law and economics

JEL Classification: K00, K40, K41

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Date posted: August 17, 2011 ; Last revised: June 6, 2012

Suggested Citation

Shepherd, Joanna, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior (July 1, 2011). University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 5, 2011; Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-164; Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-110. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910918

Contact Information

Joanna Shepherd (Contact Author)
Emory University School of Law ( email )
1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-8957 (Phone)
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