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Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility and Decrease Leverage?


Ana Fostel


George Washington University

John Geanakoplos


Yale University - Cowles Foundation

August 18, 2011

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1762RR

Abstract:     
A recent literature shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage. However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility, that is, it assumes an inverse relationship between first and second moments of asset returns. This paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become more volatile in bad times. Agents choose these technologies because they can be leveraged more during normal times. Together with the existing literature this explains pro-cyclical leverage. The result also gives a rationale to the pattern of volatility smiles observed in stock options since 1987. Finally, the paper presents for the first time a dynamic model in which an asset is endogenously traded simultaneously at different margin requirements in equilibrium.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Collateral, Endogenous leverage, VaR, Volatility, Volatility smile

JEL Classification: D52, D53, E44, G01, G11, G12

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Date posted: August 19, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Fostel, Ana and Geanakoplos, John, Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility and Decrease Leverage? (August 18, 2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1762RR. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911998

Contact Information

Ana Fostel
George Washington University ( email )
2115 G Street, NW, Suite 370
Washington, DC 20052
United States
HOME PAGE: http://home.gwu.edu/~afostel/
John Geanakoplos (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3397 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_gean.htm
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