Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912063
 
 

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The Politics of Judicial Opposition


Joanna Shepherd


Emory University School of Law

2010

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol 166, p. 88, 2010
Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-165
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-112

Abstract:     
Existing studies of judicial decision-making have found that elected judges are more likely to dissent and to oppose judges from the same party. These findings are explained by elected judges having stronger preferences for risk or being more independent. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation: judges’ efforts to be retained should yield different patterns of opposition among judges facing reelection and reappointment. I test my hypothesis using data from four years of state supreme courts decisions. Estimation results from probit models and mixed effects nested logit models suggest that judges’ retention concerns are important influences on their opposition voting.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: judicial decision-making, dissent

JEL Classification: K00, K40, K41

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Date posted: August 19, 2011 ; Last revised: June 6, 2012

Suggested Citation

Shepherd, Joanna, The Politics of Judicial Opposition (2010). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol 166, p. 88, 2010; Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-165; Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-112. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912063

Contact Information

Joanna Shepherd (Contact Author)
Emory University School of Law ( email )
1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-8957 (Phone)
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