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Litigation versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent-Seekers


Paul H. Rubin


Emory University - Department of Economics

Christopher Curran


Emory University - Department of Economics

John Curran


Chicago Mercantile Exchange

October 27, 1999


Abstract:     
To change the law, an interest group must choose between lobbying the legislature and litigating for new precedent. Lobbying becomes more likely as the relative benefits from rule change become greater, as the costs of lobbying become smaller and as the voting strength of the interest groups becomes larger. Litigating becomes more likely as trial costs fall, as the relative benefits from rule change become greater, as the inclination of courts to change existing precedents increases, and as the interest group is involved in more trials. Examples of using a litigating strategy include the NAACP is its battle for racial integration and attorneys seeking change in tort law. Business, in resisting changes to tort law, has used the judicial process. The nature of equilibrium, if any, is not clear.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

JEL Classification: D7, H0, K0, L5

working papers series


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Date posted: December 6, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Rubin, Paul H., Curran, Christopher and Curran, John, Litigation versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent-Seekers (October 27, 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=191269 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.191269

Contact Information

Paul H. Rubin (Contact Author)
Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )
1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-931-0493 (Phone)
630-604-9609 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.emory.edu/Rubi.htm
Christopher Curran
Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )
1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-6355 (Phone)
404-727-4639 (Fax)
John Curran
Chicago Mercantile Exchange ( email )
Chicago, IL 60606
United States
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