Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets
Antonio Romero-Medina Sr.
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
Universidad de Chile - CEA, Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial
August 19, 2011
This paper analyzes the role of acyclicity in singleton cores. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Furthermore, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores. If ﬁrms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is obtained through a procedure that resembles a serial dictatorship. Thus, acyclicity generalizes the notion of common preferences. It follows that if the ﬁrms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is strongly efficient for the other side of the market.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15
Keywords: Stable Matching, Acyclicity, Singleton Cores
JEL Classification: C71, C78, D71working papers series
Date posted: August 21, 2011 ; Last revised: August 22, 2011
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