Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914605
 
 

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Immunity Shopping


Robert Flannigan


University of Saskatchewan

August 22, 2011

Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 37, p. 39, 2011

Abstract:     
Some jurisdictions specify that the local liability exposure of a foreign legal form is defined by the liability configuration fashioned for that form by the foreign state. That blind displacement of local regulation has never been credibly justified. The regulation of risk within a jurisdiction is distorted or enfeebled when the formulation of local accountability is ceded to foreign authorities. A general rule of deference to foreign liability rules potentially subjects local competitors to uneven competition and the local population to increased levels of risk. A general rule of local dominance is preferable, even where the asymmetry of a foreign liability rule has a genuine policy justification in the foreign state.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: immunity shopping, jurisdiction shopping, comity, internal affairs, liability shield, unanimous shareholder agreement, nonprofit corporation, pseudo-foreign, foreign dominance, local dominance

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Date posted: August 23, 2011 ; Last revised: January 10, 2013

Suggested Citation

Flannigan, Robert, Immunity Shopping (August 22, 2011). Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 37, p. 39, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914605 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1914605

Contact Information

Robert Flannigan (Contact Author)
University of Saskatchewan ( email )
15 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A6
Canada
306-966-5876 (Phone)
306-966-5900 (Fax)
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