Pay for Regulator Performance
Boston University School of Law
M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago - Law School
August 24, 2011
U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 574
Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-43
Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-43
Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent Financial Crisis. Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have called for the reform of banker pay practices. In this Article, we argue that regulator pay is to blame as well, and that fixing it may be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. Regulatory failures during the Financial Crisis resulted at least in part from a lack of sufficient incentives for examiners to act aggressively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid for performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus programs, the bonuses have been allocated in highly inefficient ways. We propose that regulators, specifically bank examiners, be compensated with a debt-heavy mix of phantom bank equity and debt, as well as a separate bonus linked to the timing of the decision to shut down a bank. Our pay-for-performance approach for regulators would help reduce the incidence of future regulatory failures.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 78
Keywords: bank, bank examiner, banking regulation, incentive pay, pay for performance, financial crisis
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G38, J33, K23, L51
Date posted: August 28, 2011 ; Last revised: September 12, 2011
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