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The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal FamiliesNuno M. GaroupaUniversity of Illinois College of Law Carlos Gómez LigüerreUniversitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law July 25, 2011 Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2012 Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-31 Abstract: Many legal economists have suggested that the common law system is more conducive to economic growth than the civil law system. Such literature has been popularized within the legal origins movement. From the perspective of such literature, the existence of hybrid, pluralist or mixed legal jurisdictions is a puzzle. Why has civil law persisted while common law is more efficient? This paper discusses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis from the perspective of hybrid jurisdictions. We argue that the complexities of legal systems require a more nuanced analysis. The consequence is that there is no single efficient outcome, thus undermining the “one-size-fits-all” theory of the legal origins literature.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 working papers seriesDate posted: August 25, 2011 ; Last revised: August 30, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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