The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal Families
Nuno M. Garoupa
Texas A&M University School of Law; Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law
Carlos Gómez Ligüerre
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law
July 25, 2011
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2012
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-31
Many legal economists have suggested that the common law system is more conducive to economic growth than the civil law system. Such literature has been popularized within the legal origins movement. From the perspective of such literature, the existence of hybrid, pluralist or mixed legal jurisdictions is a puzzle. Why has civil law persisted while common law is more efficient?
This paper discusses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis from the perspective of hybrid jurisdictions. We argue that the complexities of legal systems require a more nuanced analysis. The consequence is that there is no single efficient outcome, thus undermining the “one-size-fits-all” theory of the legal origins literature.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Date posted: August 25, 2011 ; Last revised: August 30, 2011
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