Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916766
 
 

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The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal Families


Nuno M. Garoupa


Texas A&M University School of Law; Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law

Carlos Gómez Ligüerre


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law

July 25, 2011

Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2012
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-31

Abstract:     
Many legal economists have suggested that the common law system is more conducive to economic growth than the civil law system. Such literature has been popularized within the legal origins movement. From the perspective of such literature, the existence of hybrid, pluralist or mixed legal jurisdictions is a puzzle. Why has civil law persisted while common law is more efficient?

This paper discusses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis from the perspective of hybrid jurisdictions. We argue that the complexities of legal systems require a more nuanced analysis. The consequence is that there is no single efficient outcome, thus undermining the “one-size-fits-all” theory of the legal origins literature.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25


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Date posted: August 25, 2011 ; Last revised: August 30, 2011

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno M. and Gómez Ligüerre, Carlos, The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal Families (July 25, 2011). Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2012; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-31. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916766

Contact Information

Nuno M. Garoupa (Contact Author)
Texas A&M University School of Law ( email )
1515 Commerce St.
Fort Worth, TX 76102
United States
Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law ( email )
Portugal
Carlos Gómez Ligüerre
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
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