Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917111
 
 

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Civil War, Social Capital and Market Development: Experimental and Survey Evidence on the Negative Consequences of Violence


Alessandra Cassar


University of San Francisco - Department of Economics

Pauline Grosjean


The University of New South Wales

Sam Whitt


High Point University - Department of Political Science

August 25, 2011


Abstract:     
Recent studies have reported surprising increases in pro-social behavior following exposure to conflict. However, our research provides cautionary evidence of some important detrimental effects of conflict hidden within an overall trend toward increasing certain pro-social preferences. We draw our inferences from experimental and survey evidence we collected from a random sample in post-war Tajikistan. More than a decade after the civil war, which was characterized by insurgency and community infighting, exposure to conflict has opened a significant gap between norms people apply to others in their local communities compared to distant others. Our results show how conflict exposure undermines trust and fairness within local communities, decreases the willingness to engage in impersonal exchange, and reinforces kinship-based norms of morality. The robustness of the results to the use of pre-war controls, village fixed effects and alternative samples suggests that selection into victimization is unlikely to be the factor driving the results.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Civil War, Trust Game, Dictator Game, Market Institutions, Experimental Methods, Central Asia

JEL Classification: C93, D03, O53, P30

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Date posted: August 27, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Cassar, Alessandra and Grosjean, Pauline and Whitt, Sam, Civil War, Social Capital and Market Development: Experimental and Survey Evidence on the Negative Consequences of Violence (August 25, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1917111

Contact Information

Alessandra Cassar
University of San Francisco - Department of Economics ( email )
2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117-1080
United States
Pauline Grosjean (Contact Author)
The University of New South Wales ( email )
Department of Economics
Australian School of Business
Sydney, NSW NSW 2052
Australia
Sam Whitt
High Point University - Department of Political Science ( email )
833 Montlieu Avenue
High Point, NC 27262
United States
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