|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
The Design of Licensing Contracts: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Electrical Engineering in Imperial GermanyCarsten BurhopMax Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Thorsten LuebbersMax Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods July 1, 2011 MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2011/18 Abstract: We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical results suggest that strategic behavior seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29 Keywords: economic history, Germany pre-1913, licensing contracts, technology transfer JEL Classification: N83, L14, O32 working papers seriesDate posted: August 30, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.656 seconds
