Abstract

  


 



Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets


Asim Ijaz Khwaja


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Atif R. Mian


Princeton University - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; NBER
September 2011

Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 579-600, 2011

Abstract:     
We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches taken in the recent literature.

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: August 31, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Mian, Atif R., Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets (September 2011). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 579-600, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080310

Contact Information

Asim Ijaz Khwaja (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Atif R. Mian
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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