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Information Effects of Conservatism in Accounting


Juan Manuel García Lara


Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration

Beatriz Garcia Osma


Universidad Autonoma de Madrid

Fernando Penalva


IESE Business School - University of Navarra

August 31, 2011


Abstract:     
We study the information consequences of conservatism in accounting for financial analysts, debtholders and stockholders. We expect conservatism to improve the firm information environment by ameliorating information asymmetry problems, reducing uncertainty about the firm information structure, and facilitating the assessment of future earnings and cash flows. Using a large US sample for the period 1976-2006, we find that an increase in firm-level conservatism leads to (i) a decrease in information asymmetry, (ii) a decrease in stock returns volatility, (iii) an improvement in analysts’ forecasts accuracy, (iv) a reduction in credit risk, and (v) a decrease in expected cost of equity capital. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Accounting conservatism, asymmetric reporting, information environment, information precision, uncertainty, cost of capital

JEL Classification: G10, G38, M41

working papers series


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Date posted: September 1, 2011  

Suggested Citation

García Lara, Juan Manuel, Garcia Osma, Beatriz and Penalva, Fernando, Information Effects of Conservatism in Accounting (August 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1920356

Contact Information

Juan Manuel García Lara (Contact Author)
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )
Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain
Beatriz Garcia Osma
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid ( email )
Departamento de Contabilidad
Avda. Fco. Tomas y Valiente 5
Madrid, Madrid 28049
Spain
Fernando Penalva
IESE Business School - University of Navarra ( email )
Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
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