Abstract

 


 



How to Give a Meaningful Interpretation to the Efficiency Defence in European Competition Law?


Pál Szilágyi


Competition Law Research Centre; Péter Pázmány Catholic University

August 31, 2011


Abstract:     
The role of the efficiency defence in competition law, particularly in European Union competition law was always heavily debated since the adoption of the first merger regulation in the European Community, later the European Union. According to the current interpretation of the notion of dominance by the ECJ it is not possible to justify a merger creating or strengthening a dominant position based on efficiency justification. Moreover, the structural presumptions underlying the system of merger control prevail in such situations. If the merged undertaking does not have a dominant position, efficiency gains can outweigh the harm to competition on the condition that the benefits reach the consumers. This approach is not only consistent with past case law, but is also reflecting the traditions of the Harvard- and Freiburg Schools. Oligopoly theory suggests that concentration on the market is a very relevant factor and this is reflected in the SIEC test.

This a revised version of the previous working paper under the same title.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: merger control, efficiencies, efficiency defence, efficiency offence

JEL Classification: K21

working papers series


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Date posted: August 31, 2011 ; Last revised: November 1, 2011

Suggested Citation

Szilágyi, Pál, How to Give a Meaningful Interpretation to the Efficiency Defence in European Competition Law? (August 31, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1920463

Contact Information

Pál Szilágyi (Contact Author)
Competition Law Research Centre ( email )
PPKE-JAK
Szentkiralyi u. 28.
Budapest, H-1088
Hungary
HOME PAGE: http://www.versenyjog.com
Péter Pázmány Catholic University ( email )
Szentkirályi u. 28.
Budapest, 1088
Hungary
HOME PAGE: http://www.jak.ppke.hu
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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