Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920796
 
 

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Bankers' Compensation and Fair Value Accounting


Gilad Livne


University of Exeter Business School

Alistair Milne


Loughborough University - School of Business and Economics

Garen Markarian


Fundación Instituto de Empresa, S.L. - IE Business School; Rice University

September 1, 2011

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 1096-1115

Abstract:     
This paper examines the role of certain fair value accounting (FVA) outcomes in compensation of US bank CEOs. The use of FVA in compensation invites an agency cost - the clawback problem - if cash compensation is based on unrealized profits that may reverse in the future. At the same time FVA may be a good measure of current managerial effort and so be cash compensated. We find evidence consistent with a positive link between CEO cash bonus and fair value (FV) valuation of trading assets, managed for short-term profit, as well as (amongst banks with limited trading exposure) a positive link between CEO pay and FV valuations of available for sale (AFS) assets. We find no evidence that trading income is incrementally compensation relevant, indicating that compensation committees avoided the clawback problem for unrealized trading gains. The paper also provides evidence on the link between FVA outcomes and equity-based pay.

Keywords: Clawback problem, Fair value accounting, Cash bonus, Compensation, Banking crisis

JEL Classification: M41, M43, G20, J33

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 1, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Livne, Gilad and Milne, Alistair and Markarian, Garen, Bankers' Compensation and Fair Value Accounting (September 1, 2011). Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 1096-1115. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920796

Contact Information

Gilad Livne
University of Exeter Business School ( email )
Streatham Court
Rennes Drive
Exeter, EX4 4JH
United Kingdom
+44(0)1392 724436 (Phone)
Alistair K. L. Milne
Loughborough University - School of Business and Economics ( email )
Epinal Way
Loughborough
Leicestershire, LE11 3TU
United Kingdom
Garen Markarian (Contact Author)
Fundación Instituto de Empresa, S.L. - IE Business School ( email )
Madrid
Spain
Rice University ( email )
6100 South Main Street
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
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