Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920886
 


 



Sex-Difference in Risk-Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: Evidence from Females in Legislatures


Dino Falaschetti


Mercatus Center

August 31, 2011

Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper No. 11-16
FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 535

Abstract:     
Suzanne Scotchmer (2008) showed how a sex difference in risk taking can cause promotional patterns to differ across sex, even if discrimination is absent and candidate-ability is identically distributed across males and females. In this model, (1) winner-take-all promotions favor risk-taking males, but (2) promoted females enjoy greater ability and (3) see this advantage depreciate with repeated play. We find evidence for each of these implications – first in how the sex composition of national legislatures differs across electoral mechanisms (winner-take-all chambers employ a significantly greater proportion of males), and second in how re-election prospects for US Representatives differ by sex (females expect longer durations in a winner-take-all chamber, but only when evaluated early in their incumbencies). These results cannot easily be dismissed as statistical artifacts, are difficult to rationalize within received models, and have important implications for affirmative action doctrines and corporate fiduciary duties.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Winner-take-all games, endogenous preference formation, risk aversion, electoral rules, female representation in legislatures, affirmative action, corporate law

JEL Classification: B52, D72, J16, J71, J78

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: September 2, 2011 ; Last revised: September 8, 2011

Suggested Citation

Falaschetti, Dino, Sex-Difference in Risk-Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: Evidence from Females in Legislatures (August 31, 2011). Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming; FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper No. 11-16; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 535. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920886

Contact Information

Dino Falaschetti (Contact Author)
Mercatus Center ( email )
3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
(703) 993-4930 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mercatus.org
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 580
Downloads: 41

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.312 seconds