Abstract

 


 



Naïve and Capricious: Stumbling into the Ring of Self-Control Conflict


Kristian Ove R. Myrseth


ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Conny E. Wollbrant


Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law

September 1, 2011


Published in Journal of Economic Psychology 34(1): 8-19

ESMT Working Paper No. 11-09

Abstract:     
We model self-control conflict as a stochastic struggle of an agent against a visceral influence, which impels the agent to act sub-optimally. The agent holds costly pre-commitment technology to avoid the conflict altogether and may decide whether to procure pre-commitment or to confront the visceral influence. We examine naïve expectations for the strength of the visceral influence; underestimating the visceral influence may lead the agent to exaggerate the expected utility of resisting temptation, and so mistakenly forego pre-commitment. Our analysis reveals conditions under which higher willpower – and lower visceral influence – reduces welfare. We further demonstrate that lowering risk aversion could reduce welfare. The aforementioned results call into question certain policy measures aimed at helping people improve their own behavior.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: self-control, temptation, inter-temporal choice, pre-commitment

JEL Classification: D01, D03, D69, D90

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Date posted: September 3, 2011 ; Last revised: February 13, 2013

Suggested Citation

Myrseth, Kristian Ove R. and Wollbrant, Conny E., Naïve and Capricious: Stumbling into the Ring of Self-Control Conflict (September 1, 2011).
Published in Journal of Economic Psychology 34(1): 8-19; ESMT Working Paper No. 11-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1921203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1921203

Contact Information

Kristian Ove R. Myrseth (Contact Author)
ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )
Schlossplatz 1
10117 Berlin
Germany
Conny E. Wollbrant
Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )
Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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