Abstract

 
 

References (13)



 


 



The Costs of Conflict


Adam Christopher Smith


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Daniel Houser


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Peter T. Leeson


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Ramin Ostadhossein


affiliation not provided to SSRN

June 2, 2011


Abstract:     
Violent conflict destroys resources. It generates “destruction costs.” These costs have an important effect on individuals’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. We develop two models of conflict: one in which conflict’s destruction costs are independent of individuals’ investments in “arms” - the tools of conflict - and another in which conflict’s destruction costs depend on those investments. Our models demonstrate that when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-dependent, conflict is more costly, making cooperation more likely. We test this prediction with a laboratory experiment in which subjects first choose how heavily to invest in arms and then choose whether to cooperate or conflict in an environment where interaction is repeated. In one set of treatments conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent. In another they are arms-dependent. Our experimental results support our models’ predictions. Compared to when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent, when those costs are arms-dependent, cooperation increases by nearly a third.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: conflict, anarchy, experimental economics, political economy

JEL Classification: C92, D74

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 4, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Smith, Adam Christopher, Houser, Daniel, Leeson, Peter T. and Ostadhossein, Ramin, The Costs of Conflict (June 2, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1921484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1921484

Contact Information

Adam Christopher Smith (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Daniel Houser
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
Peter T. Leeson
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com
Ramin Ostadhossein
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 211
Downloads: 15
References:  13

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.391 seconds