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Avoiding the Common Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication


Niels Petersen


Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; New York University – School of Law

September 1, 2011

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2011/22
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 10, 2012

Abstract:     
More than one hundred years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court started to refer to social science evidence in its judgments. However, this has not resonated with many constitutional courts outside the United States, in particular in continental Europe. This contribution has a twofold aim. First, it tries to show that legal reasoning in constitutional law is often based on empirical assumptions so that there is a strong need for the use of social sciences. However, constitutional courts often lack the necessary expertise to deal with empirical questions. Therefore, I will discuss three potential strategies to make use of social science evidence. Judges can interpret social facts on their own, they can afford a margin of appreciation to the legislator, or they can defer the question to social science experts. It will be argued that none of these strategies is satisfactory so that courts will have to employ a combination of different strategies. In order to illustrate the argument, I will discuss decisions of different jurisdictions, including the United States, Canada, Germany and South Africa.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: constitutional law, constitutional theory, comparative law, Canada, Germany, South Africa, United States, social sciences, empirical studies, proportionality, uncertainty, margin of appreciation, deference

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Date posted: September 6, 2011 ; Last revised: December 2, 2011

Suggested Citation

Petersen, Niels, Avoiding the Common Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication (September 1, 2011). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2011/22. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923012 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1923012

Contact Information

Niels Petersen (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+49 228 914 1667 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/niels_petersen
New York University – School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
HOME PAGE: http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/fellows/12-13/NielsPetersen.html
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