Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?
Kevin Patrick Tobia
University of Oxford - St. Hilda's College
CUNY - The Graduate Center
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey; University of Sheffield
September 6, 2011
Recently psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people’s moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the content of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers’ moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16
Keywords: intuition, expertise defense, actor-observer biasworking papers series
Date posted: September 6, 2011 ; Last revised: May 7, 2012
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.500 seconds