Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?
Kevin Patrick Tobia
University of Oxford - St. Hilda's College
University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey; University of Sheffield
September 6, 2011
Philosophical Psychology, 26(5): 629-638
Recently psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people’s moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the content of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers’ moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16
Keywords: intuition, expertise defense, actor-observer biasAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 6, 2011 ; Last revised: November 27, 2013
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