Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923392
 
 

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Stereotypes and Madrassas: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan


Adeline Delavande


New University of Lisbon - Faculdade de Economia

Basit Zafar


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

May 6, 2011

RAND Working Paper Series WR- 859

Abstract:     
Little is known about the behavior of Madrassa (Islamic religious seminaries) students, how Madrassas shape their behavior, and how other groups in their communities interact with them. To investigate this, we use experimental data that we collected from students pursuing bachelors-equivalent degrees in Madrassas and other educational institutions of distinct religious tendencies and socioeconomic background in Pakistan. First, we find that Madrassa students are the most trusting, exhibit the highest level of other-regarding behavior and expect others to be the most trustworthy. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the higher pro-social behavior of Madrassa students can be attributed, at least in part, to Madrassa attendance. Second, there is a high level of trust among all groups. Third, within each institution group, we fail to find evidence of in-group bias or systematic out-group bias either in trust or tastes. Fourth, we find that students from certain backgrounds under-estimate the trustworthiness of Madrassa students.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: Trust, Unconditional Other-regarding behavior, Identity, Religion, Expectations, Discrimination

JEL Classification: C91, C92, I20, Z12

working papers series


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Date posted: September 7, 2011 ; Last revised: December 15, 2011

Suggested Citation

Delavande, Adeline and Zafar, Basit, Stereotypes and Madrassas: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan (May 6, 2011). RAND Working Paper Series WR- 859. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923392 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1923392

Contact Information

Adeline Delavande (Contact Author)
New University of Lisbon - Faculdade de Economia ( email )
Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+35 1 21 380 16 00 (Phone)
+35 1 21 387 09 33 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://docentes.fe.unl.pt/~adeline/page2.html
Basit Zafar
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
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