Abstract

 


 



The Role of Economic Efficiency in Medical Malpractice Reform Policy


Ben Boozer


Jacksonville State University

Christopher Westley


Jacksonville State University, Alabama

Robert J. Landry III


Jacksonville State University - College of Commerce and Business Administration

July 9, 2008

International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 20-33, Summer 2008

Abstract:     
Through an analysis of medical malpractice votes, a measure of economic efficiency was found to be a statistically significant contributor to a vote for medical malpractice reform. This paper argues that vote models should include such a measure as a supplement to traditional measures of self-interest and ideology that explain legislator behavior. Self-interest and ideology reflect normative characteristics of a representative, while economic efficiency considers maximization of net benefits of policy formulation and is positive. Including economic efficiency in voting models offers insight as to the type of polices that are chosen and frames the legislator’s voting decision in economic terms through a consideration of the aggregate effect of such policymaking.

Keywords: health care economics, law and economics, malpractice, tort law

JEL Classification: I11, K13, K4

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: September 10, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Boozer, Ben, Westley, Christopher and Landry, Robert J., The Role of Economic Efficiency in Medical Malpractice Reform Policy (July 9, 2008). International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 20-33, Summer 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925134

Contact Information

Ben Boozer
Jacksonville State University ( email )
11901 Beach Blvd.
Jacksonville, FL 32246
United States
Christopher Westley (Contact Author)
Jacksonville State University, Alabama ( email )
Department of Finance, Economics, and Accounting
Jacksonville, AL 36265
United States
Robert J. Landry III
Jacksonville State University - College of Commerce and Business Administration ( email )
Merrill Building 102C
700 Pelham Road
Jacksonville, AL 36265
United States
2567828419 (Phone)
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