Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431
 
 

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Don’t 'Screw Joe the Plummer': The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform


Kimberly D. Krawiec


Duke University - School of Law

January 25, 2013

55 Az. L. Rev. 53 (2013)

Abstract:     
This article employs section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, popularly known as the Volcker rule, to examine agency level activity during the pre-proposal rulemaking phase – a time period about which little is known, despite its importance to policy outcomes. By capitalizing on transparency efforts specific to Dodd-Frank, I am able to access information on agency contacts whose disclosure is not required by the APA and, therefore, not typically available to researchers.

I analyze the roughly 8000 public comment letters received by FSOC in advance of its study regarding Volcker rule implementation, and the meeting logs of the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, CFTC, SEC, and FDIC prior to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. This analysis reveals significant public activity, but also a stark difference in investment by financial institutions versus other actors in influencing Volcker rule implementation. It also reveals a greater unity of interest among financial market participants than would be suggested by press reports and the provision’s legislative history. Finally, the data shed light on the efficacy of the notice and comment process as a means for federal agencies to engage the general public.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Dodd-Frank, Volcker rule, agency rulemaking, comment letters, meeting logs

JEL Classification: K00, K20, K23, K22

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Date posted: September 11, 2011 ; Last revised: January 21, 2014

Suggested Citation

Krawiec, Kimberly D., Don’t 'Screw Joe the Plummer': The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform (January 25, 2013). 55 Az. L. Rev. 53 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1925431

Contact Information

Kimberly D. Krawiec (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
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