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The End of the Internal Compliance World as We Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions


Justin Robert Blount


Stephen F. Austin State University, Rusche College of Business; Baylor University - Law School

Spencer Markel


Georgetown University Law Center

August 12, 2011

Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. XVII, Spring 2012

Abstract:     
In the wake of Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme and the recent economic crisis stemming largely from loosely regulated subprime lending and mortgage-backed securities, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) on July 21, 2010, signaling loudly and clearly that change is coming to Wall Street. But Wall Street is not the only one receiving a message. Buried deep within the 2,319 pages of the Dodd-Frank Act, companies can find Section 922, the whistleblower provision, which provides a bounty for whistleblowers who report securities violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

These bounty provisions and the subsequent rules implementing them have been criticized by many as ineffective and unnecessarily intrusive on established internal compliance programs. In light of these criticisms, this Article analyzes the Dodd-Frank bounty program and its likely effect on corporate internal compliance programs, relying largely upon literature and studies in the areas of behavioral economics, organizational behavior, and business ethics relating to whistleblowing. The authors argue that rather than undermining internal compliance programs, the Dodd-Frank bounty program will serve as a much needed check on poorly administered internal compliance that are not adequately policing fraud and unethical behavior.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: whistleblowing, internal compliance, bounty, ethics, corporate governance, Dodd-Frank

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Date posted: September 26, 2011 ; Last revised: November 24, 2011

Suggested Citation

Blount, Justin Robert and Markel, Spencer, The End of the Internal Compliance World as We Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions (August 12, 2011). Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. XVII, Spring 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1925463

Contact Information

Justin Robert Blount (Contact Author)
Stephen F. Austin State University, Rusche College of Business ( email )
United States
Baylor University - Law School ( email )
Sheila & Walter Umphrey Law Center
1114 South University Parks Drive
Waco, TX 76706
United States
Spencer Markel
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
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