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Promoting Domestic Reforms Through Regionalism


Philippa Dee


Australian National University - Crawford School of Public Policy

April 1, 2011

Crawford School Research Paper No. 7

Abstract:     
There is a strong presumption among economists that domestic reforms are promoted by regionalism. Yet strong empirical evidence for this proposition is lacking. The purpose of the paper is to examine in some detail both the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on this issue, drawing on the relevant economic, political and legal literatures. The paper argues that in general, the case for reciprocity in domestic reforms is weak. In the one case where a regional agreement appears to have promoted domestic reform — the European Union — the enforcement mechanisms used by the European Court of Justice played a significant role. But those mechanisms are not unique. Instead, the paper argues that the EU’s success was because domestic constituents were empowered to take action against uncompetitive regulation. Thus the EU promoted economic reform in sensitive, behind‐the‐border areas because it overcame the problem of loss of sovereignty by internalising the political battle to domestic interests, and yet still provided a non‐political frame of reference for the debate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Domestic reform, structural reform, services trade reform, political economy, regionalism, preferential trade agreements, WTO, GATS, European Union, European Court of Justice, doctrine of direct effect

JEL Classification: D02, D04, D78, F13, F15, F53, F55

working papers series


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Date posted: September 27, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Dee, Philippa, Promoting Domestic Reforms Through Regionalism (April 1, 2011). Crawford School Research Paper No. 7. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1925934

Contact Information

Philippa Dee (Contact Author)
Australian National University - Crawford School of Public Policy ( email )
Crawford Building (132)
Lennox Crossing, ANU
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia
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