|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Institutional Investor Preferences and Executive CompensationJoseph A. McCaheryTilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) Zacharias SautnerUniversity of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Business School; Duisenberg School of Finance; Tinbergen Institute January 5, 2012 Research Handbook on Executive Pay, edited by J. Hill and R. Thomas, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2012-002 CentER Working Paper Series No. 2012-004 Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the attitudes of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds, towards a key corporate governance mechanism, namely executive compensation. We document the preferences they have about both the level and structure of executive compensation. Our analysis takes a comparative approach as we ask investors to reveal their preferences both for firms in the U.S. and in The Netherlands. Our analysis further sheds light on who should decide on executive pay, thereby contributing to the recent debate on shareholder involvement in executive pay. Finally, we examine their views on the most important and largest component of executive pay, executive stock options, and investigate what preferences they have when it comes to the design of such options.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23 Keywords: Executive Compensation, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance JEL Classification: G34 working papers seriesDate posted: September 13, 2011 ; Last revised: August 2, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.813 seconds
