Institutional Investor Preferences and Executive Compensation
Joseph A. McCahery
Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
January 5, 2012
Research Handbook on Executive Pay, edited by J. Hill and R. Thomas, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2012-002
CentER Working Paper Series No. 2012-004
In this paper, we investigate the attitudes of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds, towards a key corporate governance mechanism, namely executive compensation. We document the preferences they have about both the level and structure of executive compensation. Our analysis takes a comparative approach as we ask investors to reveal their preferences both for firms in the U.S. and in The Netherlands. Our analysis further sheds light on who should decide on executive pay, thereby contributing to the recent debate on shareholder involvement in executive pay. Finally, we examine their views on the most important and largest component of executive pay, executive stock options, and investigate what preferences they have when it comes to the design of such options.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G34working papers series
Date posted: September 13, 2011 ; Last revised: August 2, 2012
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