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Venture Capital Communities


Amit Bubna


Indian School of Business

Sanjiv Ranjan Das


Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business

Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala


University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

September 14, 2012


Abstract:     
We analyze the social network of venture capital (VC) firms formed through co-syndications and develop new evidence on the composition of VC syndicates. We show that while VCs can have several syndicate partners, they exhibit strong preference for some partners over others, leading to spatial agglomerates. These "communities" are soft border conglomerates whose members are probabilistically more likely to interact within than outside. We characterize the number, identity, composition, and stability of communities. We show that preferred partner choice reflects {\it both} assortative and disassortative matching. Partners are similar on dimensions of functional style and heterogeneous on dimensions of influence and reach. Finally, firms sourcing capital from community VCs are more likely to exit successfully. The results are consistent with learning-by-doing models in which familiar partners aid learning, or with incomplete contracting models where familiarity mitigates hold up and free riding by facilitating trust and reciprocity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Venture Capital, Syndication, Community Detection, Social Networks, Boundaries of the Firm

JEL Classification: G20, G24

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Date posted: September 17, 2011 ; Last revised: September 16, 2012

Suggested Citation

Bubna, Amit, Das, Sanjiv Ranjan and Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., Venture Capital Communities (September 14, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928004 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1928004

Contact Information

Amit Bubna
Indian School of Business ( email )
Hyderabad, Gachibowli 500 019
India

Sanjiv Ranjan Das
Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business ( email )
Department of Finance
321E Lucas Hall
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
HOME PAGE: http://algo.scu.edu/~sanjivdas/
Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )
4427 Van Munching Hall
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
301-405-2165 (Phone)
301-405-0359 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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