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An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the 'Marginally Indigent'Morris B. HoffmanSecond Judicial District Court Judge, State of Colorado Paul H. RubinEmory University - Department of Economics Joanna ShepherdEmory University School of Law 2005 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 3, 2005 Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-116 Abstract: An econometric study of all felony cases filed in Denver, Colorado, in 2002, shows that public defenders achieved poorer outcomes than their privately retained counterparts, measured by the actual sentences defendants received. But this study suggests that the traditional explanation for this difference - underfunding resulting in overburdened public defenders - may not tell the whole story. The authors discovered a large segment of what they call “marginally indigent” defendants, who appear capable of hiring private counsel if the charges against them are sufficiently serious. These results suggest that at least one explanation for poor public defender outcomes may be that public defender clients, by self-selection, tend to have less defensible cases. If marginally indigent defendants can find the money to hire private counsel when the charges are sufficiently serious, perhaps they can also find the money when they are innocent, or think they have a strong case.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34 Keywords: attorney effectiveness, public defender, private attorney, indigent defendants JEL Classification: K0, K14, K40 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 17, 2011 ; Last revised: October 13, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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